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BOOK REVIEWS

THE CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
Utgoff, Victor A., ed. The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 2000. 319pp. $22.95

The Coming Crisis is a series of essays by
noted scholars in the field of national security affairs examining the effects of
continued nuclear weapons proliferation
and the potential for regional nuclear crises. While one can argue that use of nuclear weapons by a rogue state today is
more likely than it was during the Cold
War, discussion of what the United
States could and should do if deterrence
fails has been noticeably absent in recent
years. The authors revive this discussion
and, in doing so, contribute significantly
to the study of proliferation.
The first half of the book addresses the
underlying pressures that cause states to
consider acquiring and potentially employing nuclear weapons. It makes the
case that there are many reasons why a
state may develop nuclear weapons, reasons that may have only a peripheral relationship to security issues. A highlight
of this section is Caroline F. Ziemke’s essay on the strategic personality of Iran.
She asserts that the behavior of a “rogue
state” often has roots in national myth.
These nations may not be as unpredictable and as roguish as we might surmise
at first glance.
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The second part of the book consists of
five essays that examine how nuclear crises might develop between the United
States and a regional nuclear power, and
what the consequences might be. Stephen
Peter Rosen and Stephen M. Walt each
examine the impact of proliferation on
alliances and coalitions, but they come to
contradictory conclusions. Barry R.
Posen conducts a hypothetical analysis of
a Gulf War with a nuclear-armed Iraq.
His conclusion is that, faced with such a
crisis, the United States should not and
probably would not hesitate to intervene
to defend vital interests.
Two essays focus on what the United
States might do following a first use by a
regional aggressor. George H. Quester argues that a U.S. response in such a case
would be driven more by American
norms of law enforcement than by Cold
War theory. Quester believes that criminals are punished for four distinct reasons: to disarm, to make an example, to
impose revenge, and to reform. He states
that once a regime with a modest nuclear
capability has used nuclear weapons, it
will be seen as “too dangerous to live
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with . . . but not too dangerous to
defeat.”
Similarly, Brad Roberts discusses regional
nuclear war termination, arguing that the
United States would have not only to address the immediate problems presented
by the war but also to ensure that longerterm U.S. interests were served by “winning the peace” that follows. The United
States has to avoid being perceived as a
“nuclear bully” whose power must be
counterbalanced, but neither can it come
off as a “nuclear wimp,” unwilling to
confront an aggressor. Instead, the
course of action chosen must show the
United States to be a responsible and just
steward of the international good.
In the concluding chapter, Victor A.
Utgoff contends that in response to a regional nuclear threat the United States
would likely be far more resolute than
others have suggested and would likely
respond in kind to a first use of nuclear
weapons by an aggressor. He concludes
with a number of policy implications.
The fundamental premise of this book is
that sooner or later the proliferation of
nuclear weapons is going to lead to a
confrontation between the United States
and a nuclear-armed state. While there
are many points of disagreement between
the authors, all concur that such a confrontation will be a seminal event and
will define not only the role of nuclear
weapons but also that of the world’s only
superpower in the post–Cold War era.
All students of national security policy
owe it to themselves to consider the policy implications of this premise. The
Coming Crisis will be valuable to them.
JON GREENE

Commander, U.S. Navy
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Lavoy, Peter, Scott Sagan, and James Wirtz, eds.
Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will
Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 2000. 270pp. $45

The title says it all. This book is a compilation of empirical and analytical data on
the strategic evolution of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) agents and
weapons in the twenty-first century. A
central theme of the book is how new regional players (states and nonstate actors) are likely to convert prevalent
conventional military doctrine and training into nonconventional means of warfare. The book is very ambitious in its
scope; it attempts—overall, successfully—to address systematically conceptual problems in the integration of such
weapons into the military infrastructure,
delivery systems, command and control
procedures, and war plans. More importantly, the editors and the authors of the
various case studies utilize a theoretical
framework to explain and predict future
trends of behaviors, intentions, and capabilities among very diverse players. Realism and neorealism, organizational
theory, and culture are used to flesh out
these unique differences in approach as
well as in the implementation of NBC
programs and doctrines.
Except for the conclusion and the chapter
on terrorism, the chapters are case studies, focusing on Iraq, Iran, Israel, India,
Pakistan, and North Korea. The authors
are specialists who devote a great deal of
effort to describing the relationship between strategy and policy, on one hand,
and between national security and national military strategy, on the other. The
result is a complex web of relationships,
behavioral manifestations, and decisionmaking processes involving an amalgam
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